An Action Plan
Reading Bill Gates’ How to Avoid Climate Disaster, John Doerr’s Speed and Scale: An Action plan for Solving our Climate Crisis Now, and Evgeny Morozov’s To Save Everything, Click Here
What feels like ages but happened merely one year ago, in October 2021, the Russian federation approved a plan in which they committed to reaching net zero greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) by 2060. The pledge, while modest, was nonetheless widely celebrated. Of course, it was trolling: an elaborate and sad Russian joke. No one laughed then because no one understood it was a joke, and no one laughs now because after Russia intensified its attack on Ukraine, the joke is even less funny than it was before.
Everything is obvious once you know the answer. In hindsight, it is crystal clear that Russia never intended to partake in any kind of transition away from fossil fuels. They don’t want to do it, and even if they would want it, they cannot. Any former belief that contradicts this was wishful thinking.
Russia was and is a thoroughly impotent and corrupted entity that produces approximately half of its gross domestic product (GDP) with hydrocarbons. The country is hopelessly bound to the coal-based status quo with institutional constraints. Removing these constraints to enable a different kind of Russia is almost impossible.
The Russian reliance on hydrocarbons is inevitable. It manifests itself in many ways in the current world of a rapidly warming climate. Russian attack on Ukraine is one of these ways — a way to prolong and profit from the global dependence on oil. War is also a logical solution when one needs to transform military capability into internal coherence.
Future historians will very likely consider the Russian attack in the broader climate context as one example of the industrial or modern era means to constrain and hinder the global shift to post-carbon societies. The attack on Nord Stream pipelines is a direct attack on the climate.
From the perspective of the world fighting against and for the climate, other horrible geopolitical occurrences are not far-fetched ideas. Instead, they might prove to be a critical feature of the global transformation towards post-fossil-fuel societies. Importantly, geopolitical decision-making influences the lived realities of people facing climate transformation and its consequences. Social order is fragile to many kinds of shocks that the climate transformation brings about. A small swing in the price of bread can push entire countries into chaos, as is Chinese are well aware due to their recent history. There have been at least 11 famines during the last 200 years.
These days, China boasts massive granaries full of grains to avoid famines. China had 70% of the globe’s maize reserves, 60% of its rice, and 51% of its wheat in spring 2022. While China is a big country, these are large shares of reserves even for the 20% of the global population it represents. It was China’s hoarding of food reserves, and financial speculation that followed the hoarding, that increased global food prices before the Russian attack in February 2022.
Food shortages, wars, and pandemics are acute crises, but in the 21st century, the root cause behind these scourges is evolving: their common denominator is climate change. When climate changes, acute crises emerge more often and they are more severe.
Of course, to fix famines, wars, and pandemics, we need to fix the root cause. This… is not easy. To claim that climate change is a difficult problem to solve is an understatement of the century. Further, the magnitude of the task is often misinterpreted. The scale of the required human intervention is bigger than is often understood because the media discussion emphasizes cumulative emissions instead of yearly emissions. A typical conclusion from a glance at the climate change pathway graph such as the one presented here is that we need to stop producing more GHGs.
But this is not what the image tells us. The unfortunate and obvious reality is that we need to stop producing GHG altogether to create a flat graph as depicted in the previous image. The yearly emissions that produce the cumulative graph behave differently. This yearly emission graph is described in the blue graphs of the second image.
For the cumulative CHG emissions not to grow, the yearly graph must go to zero. Otherwise, the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere keeps growing.
To underline the point, I must emphasize that human systems rarely act in such ways: they have internal frictions and constraints that make change slow or nonexistent. Often these frictions and constraints are (or are caused by, depending on how one wants to frame this) institutions, manifested as repeated practices, traditions, and rules.
An institution, a routine, a practice, or even a tradition is not a legal entity. We can say that they force us to operate in a certain way, but we cannot claim that they have the responsibility. In the end, the responsibility lies with each individual. A question could be asked: What is the extent of this responsibility?
This is a crucial question that goes beyond the simple calculus of climate change. We can estimate that climate change causes death and displacement. The DICE baseline emissions scenario is estimated to cause 83 million excess deaths by 2100, 74 million of which could be avoided with a more ambitious climate policy. These are merely the direct deaths, caused by floods and other directly weather-related phenomena: the number of indirect deaths caused by infectious diseases, civil wars and interstate wars, food shortages, migrations and so on is much more difficult to estimate and more random.
The outcomes of some of these events are not linear or exponential, but binary. A wet bulb event (over 37 degrees celsius plus 100% humidity) prohibits sweating that normally cools people: such events are deadly, as described in the Ministry for the Future by Stanley Robinson. When conditions that enable such wet bulb events become more common, and they will become more common, millions of people might boil to death.
There is an easy techno-fix for wet bulb events: cooling systems. If a wet bulb event occurs in Finland, Japan, or the USA, such systems are sufficient to save most lives. But cooling requires a moderate amount of energy. Coal plants would be needed to provide sufficient electricity, causing the final cost again to fall to the poorer nations later.
Although estimating the effect of binary and indirect events is difficult, I have started to use a baseline figure of 300 000 premature deaths per each additional gigaton of emissions. The actual number will of course not grow linearly with emissions — the mortality rate increases at an increasing rate with global temperature. After 2 degrees celsius, the derivative is quite deep and increases proportionally to continuing warming. Despite that, the number I suggested gives us something simple to work with to estimate individual responsibility for climate change. Based on the figure, the yearly global emissions of 50 to 60 gigatons, accumulating in the atmosphere, cause in a long enough timeline an estimated 15 to 20 million deaths directly and indirectly linked to climate change.
Further, as the current yearly emissions for each family in Global North are between 20 to 100 tons, it would mean if my calculus is right that every average family in Global North would be responsible for one dead person, most likely in the Global South, during each generation.
How your family decides to live and consume dictates the possibilities to live for some other person you’ve never met.
These are not rookie numbers. I have a recollection that I did not verify that this living-to-kill ratio is five times higher than in Nazi Germany. While the period is longer and consequences less direct, it’s not out of the realm of reason to suggest that the responsibility of each family is five-fold.
This broader context guided me to read two books on solving the wicked problem. The books were Bill Gates’ How to Avoid Climate Disaster and John Doerr’s Speed and Scale: An Action plan for Solving our Climate Crisis Now. The cold reality commented by these books is that we need to completely stop producing greenhouse gases, and we have to do it fast. Paraphrasing Bill Gates, we need to go from 51 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide to zero. Doerr talks about 59 billion tonnes. While the difference makes a world of difference, in the end, the main takeaway is not the situation but the goal: zero.
Eventually, only zero production of new carbon dioxide will suffice. Consumption and production based on hydrocarbons increase carbon dioxide in the atmosphere permanently (as long as reasonable lifetimes for human civilizations are concerned), while binding carbon dioxide to trees is nothing more than a loan. The bound carbon dioxide will eventually return to the atmosphere when the forest burns (this becomes more likely further to the future we go) or trees fall (heavy winds will also increase). We might buy a few years more time by investing heavily in planting new trees, and we can alleviate the problem by creating new buffers from establishing completely new forests (this is not without issues either). It might make more sense to use the resources spent on planting trees in solving the problem instead of postponing it.
We have some clue about how difficult it will be to reduce carbon dioxide emissions to zero. European countries abound with windmills and rooftop solar panels. This Energiewende has helped even out the emission levels between 50 and 60 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide. The production capabilities to do the complete energy transition already exist. It seems possible that decoupling of growth from emissions can be done — at least in Europe.
However, the path to transition seems harsh. A coronavirus pandemic that stopped mass tourism and closed down entire industries for several years led to an approximately 5% reduction in yearly global emissions. The economic and human cost of the pandemic was immense, and only part of the cost was directly due to the limitations caused by the virus. Economic slowdown caused arguably more suffering.
To reach carbon neutrality by the year 2050 we need to start reducing global emissions by more than 5% every year.
Every year!
Bill Gates writes:
We need to accomplish something gigantic we have never done before, much faster than we have ever done anything similar. To do it, we need a lot of breakthroughs in science and engineering. We need to build a consensus that doesn’t exist and create public policies to push a transition that would not happen otherwise.
The chapter is revealing. The arguments of both Bill Gates and John Doerr rely on two premises:
- that techno-fixes can be applied to solve complex problems (“we need a lot of breakthroughs in science and engineering”)
- that coordinated action requires a rational consensus (“we need to build consensus — and create public policies”)
I suggest we need to reconsider both of these premises.
The takedown of the first premise is a more straightforward task. Based on the authors’ background, the belief in the ability of technology to solve problems is understandable. But there is ample evidence that techno-fixes tend to solve wrong problems.
The premises behind the books ‘How to Avoid Climate Disaster’ and ‘Speed and Scale’ advocate a specific theory of change. The ‘theory of change’ of these books operates on two distinct system levels which are separated by the premises. On the first level, one finds the world that Gates and Doerr understand thoroughly: this is the world of users, strategic corporate decisions, and market actions. I call this world system 1. The other level is the level of societies, where institutions set the rules that users, corporate decisions, and market actions necessarily follow. I call the second level system 2.
For Gates and Doerr, the decisions people make on system 1 is the game that people play, and their books represent ‘playbooks’ on how to play the game well. They acknowledge that the game has rules set by laws, practices, and path dependencies — system 2.
While Gates and Doerr both understand that the rules are set by the players, they fail to realize that the tricks of the trade that might work in climate mitigation in system 1 fail miserably in system 2. At the same time, both authors acknowledge that their playbooks only work if the rules of the game are changed. ‘I’m also a technophile.’ Bill Gates writes: ‘Show me a problem and I’ll look for technology to fix it. When it comes to climate change, I know innovation isn’t the only thing we need. But we cannot keep the earth livable without it. Techno-fixes are not sufficient, but they are necessary.’
The argument by Gates is intelligible only if the following statements are true:
- The problem that the techno-fix fixes are the right problem to fix
- The techno-fix doesn’t cause new problems that effectively lead to the same or worse outcomes (few outside crypto heads propose solving the root problem, say, capitalism, with techno-fixes).
- The solution doesn’t spend some resources ineffectively, i.e. in ways that prohibit more effective fixes. Cognitive capacity is one resource that people like Doerr and Gates can yield massively with books and other acts of communication and with their resources, so it matters that their change theories are in line with reality.
- Most demandingly, the techno-fixes lead to changes in the second system level, or the same strategies can be applied to both system levels.
My research has made me very skeptical, especially of the last statement. In his book “To save everything, click here” Evgeny Morozov claims that thinking behind techno-fixes is obscured by what he calls ‘Solutionism’. Solutionism is understanding “all complex social situations either as neatly defined problems with definite, computable solutions or as transparent and self-evident processes that can be easily optimized.”
Sometimes, solutions to more precise problems lead to worse outcomes from the perspective of more elevated questions. The vision of the Taxi platform Uber is “transportation as reliable as running water, everywhere for everyone,” but their solution merely reduced the transaction costs of getting a ride, increasing congestion and making cab driving a more precarious occupation. Perhaps it’s not a step back, but it is at most merely a side-step. Digitalized GPS-enhanced transportation reduces the burden of moving around, but it also diminishes the physical and intellectual challenges of traveling. Those challenges were learning opportunities that enhanced the capabilities of those who faced them.
To emphasize, Morozov’s point is not that all problems should not be solved. The point is that the question that is asked provokes an answer that fits the question. Can the problem be simplified as a task to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from 51 billion tonnes to zero, or is there something more to it? What other questions could be asked? What kind of solutions would they yield?
Starting with a previously framed problem demonstrates a lack of empathy in solutionism. The Silicon Valley product development model emphasizes empathy at the single user level but doesn’t have any say on empathy towards any collective. A collective is not a user nor is it typically a client (except when it is a corporation). Collectives where users belong rarely get to speak when MVPs are developed or market fits are searched. For Doerr and Gates, the collective side of techno-fixes is a barrier to change that is fixed with “better policies.” What do they mean by this?
The second premise in the books — that solutions require coordinated action that requires a rational consensus — is a claim at the core of 20th and 21st-century sociological debates.
This second premise manifests itself in many ways. It is in the background of beliefs such as that consumers need solutions for climate change. Of course, they do, but in particular, this premise claims that they need such solutions as consumers despite the obvious free-riding problems concerning rational actors and less obvious non-utilitarian needs that people possess. The argument is also visible in the belief in the necessity of elective democratic decision-making.
Habermas, the grand-old man of societal level rational coordination of actions, suggests that collective decision-making requires ‘communicative rationality.’ I consider this condition too demanding for societies. Instead of coordinated action within society, the constant collective rediscovery of reality shapes the outputs of human interactions in society.
For example, the communicative rationality regarding Finland’s NATO application was stalled for years to a consensus that Finland would apply for NATO membership should the need arise. The conditions for this ‘need’ were never established. Luckily for Finland, the Russians attacked another neighboring country first, so the consensus quickly shifted, Finland became a pro-NATO country and applied for membership in the alliance. But the shift in opinions did not frankly happen on the level of arguments. Instead, public opinion changed because the idea that Russia could attack became a part of the lived realities of Finns. It was possible to ask new questions about the nature of the geopolitical reality in Finland, and the answer was obvious.
Habermas might claim that after the rediscovery of reality, a sense of rationality is required for action to happen. I disagree also with this argument. Merely the prohibition of action of these members for the society that has figured out that their concept of reality does not match to changes perceived is enough to explain the swings and changes in values, practices, and behaviors. The removal of constraints previously held in place by these with alternative beliefs explains the societal transition. Inaction and confusion instead of rationality and dedication should be the focus of the investigation to explain variance in societies through time.
Moreover, the conditions for coordinated action in society have shifted. Transparency has been massively increased due to digitalization and the operational models of platforms could demonstrate a way forward for coordination. Bill Gates writes “I wish there was some magic invention that could steer the conversation in a more productive direction”. It is indeed revealing that it is easier to imagine massive seaweed farms and solar panels that cover the whole of Sahara than to imagine rules of conversation on platforms that guide coordinated action. The technology to do that already exists and the only thing that is missing are institutional habits, rules, and practices, governed in coordination to enable fruitful debates and interactions. The shift in the system 2.
Thus far, I have demonstrated how Gates and Doerr believe that a solution to climate change requires techno-fixes supported by consensus in the field of politics; and that both of these premises fail: techno-fixes are insufficient to swing the system 2 to another state, and coordinated action does not necessarily require a rational, shared consensus.
If one believes in the same change theory that Doerr and Gates rely on, three different forces make the situation complex: 1) institutional pressure (growth of emissions); 2) institutional configuration (inability to reach consensus between people and groups with vested interests); 3) lack of institutional solutions (techno-fixes are insufficient and at times help to maintain the previous institutional configuration). The critical insights in rediscovering the problem are to understand that 1) institutional solutions should not try to fight against the pressure but instead benefit from it; 2) institutional adaptation is not about adapting to the institutions of the past but adapting to the institutions of the future; 3) there is a lack of framings of the problems, not a lack of solutions to them.
The first insight connects the two arbitrary system levels by Gates and Doerr. The change in system-level 2 is slow and requires conscious action. It does not happen for free nor without human interaction. For the change to happen on system level 2, we need institutional entrepreneurship. Gates and Doerr imagine political and legal change, but this change requires shifts in political demand quite similarly to how startup entrepreneurs need shifts in consumer demand. While system level 1 can change when there is a product-market fit, system level 2 can change only when an entrepreneur discovers an institution-tension fit. The entrepreneurs and “entrepreneurs” who figure out how they can benefit from the increasing institutional tension will prevail. At the abstract level, this means fighting for the change, not against the change. In practice, it might mean businesses that benefit from reduced production via circular economy or energy companies that base their investments on the assumption of a high price on carbon emissions.
Considering the second insight, I have learned something important about forecasts that I consider crucial here. Predictions usually fail to take the institutional configuration into account.
The role of forecasts is similar to any other communicative act in societies: they are efforts to alter the status quo, change of which is often constrained by other actors and practices. To realize a forecast requires not understanding what is needed to realize it but instead understanding what maintains the current consequences despite the actions that are already, most likely, taken to change them.
The third insight on the lack of problems is the most important one. “How to stop climate change?” is a question that can be answered but I have demonstrated in this text that it is possible it cannot be solved. The institutional tensions cannot be mitigated from this perspective. We have to ask the question differently. An example of a more promising question could be “what values can we thrive towards without risking the rights to the same values for others?”
There are several candidates for new values, none of which are currently very popular. Some values that influence collective decisions today are freedom, convenience, and security. All of these induce costs to others in the resource-scarce world.
Our freedom in the industrial world is based on the work of others: people give up their freedom to provide other people opportunities to choose. The convenient lives we live are based on consumption that is based on similar logic. And our security is guaranteed by growth, via policing and control that reduces the security of those who do seemingly threaten our security.
We need to live by values that do not cause such externalities. Some candidates include courage, caring, commitment and integrity. Courage is toughness that is directed toward the collective good. Caring is aiming for convenience for others. Commitment is freedom as described by Martin Hägglund in This Life: freedom by choosing an identity and living by this choice. And finally, integrity is security for the collective. Any intelligible political project in the future would have to embrace these or similar values.
A political party advocating courage could emphasize investment and be willing to take risks for the collective good. A true “north star” vision for such a group could be to promise interplanetary travel and Spartan limitations to consumption to maximize the collective capabilities of the whole planet. A political party embracing caring could advocate the limitations to freedoms of some for everyone’s autonomy. Those who advocate commitment should emphasize long-term decisions and fight to provide opportunities for the civilizations to come. And the party of integrity should focus on the internal mechanisms prohibiting positive change. Its core promise is to end corruption and micro-optimization and replace them with transparent systems with audit trails and clear responsibilities.
Of course, the question on values is just one possible question. But it demonstrates new pathways for institutional entrepreneurship. There is no time to wait, nor is there time to hope for an opening in system 1 that would fix the problems at the institutional level. A change of system 2 is needed.
